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Abstract
We consider a search problem in which one or more targets must be rescued by a search
party, or Searcher. The targets may be survivors of some natural disaster, or prisoners
held by an adversary. The targets are hidden among a finite set of locations, but when
a location is searched, there is a known probability that the search will come to an end,
perhaps because the Searcher becomes trapped herself, or is captured by the adversary. If
this happens before all the targets have been recovered, then the rescue attempt is deemed
a failure. The objective is to find the search that maximizes the probability of recovering
all the targets. We present and solve a game theoretic model for this problem, by placing
it in a more general framework that encompasses another game previously introduced by
the author. We also consider an extension to the game in which the targets are hidden on
the vertices of a graph. In the case that there is only one target, we give a solution of the
game played on a tree.
Keywords: game theory; search games; search and rescue; trees
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1 Introduction
Many search and rescue operations may be dangerous for the search party, or Searcher. For
example, searching in unstable buildings for earthquake survivors, searching for lost miners in
a cave system, or performing a military rescue operation. One or more targets must be rescued,
but there is a danger that the search is cut short due to one of these threats. For example, the
Searcher is captured herself (in the case of a military operation), or to some incident caused by
Nature results in the search being terminated (such as the Searcher becoming trapped herself).
We model such operations by introducing a new search model. We assume that a known
number of targets are located among a finite set of possible locations, and at each location
there is a given probability (which may depend on the location) that when that location is
searched, the search will come to an end. The objective is to choose which order to search the
locations to maximize the probability that the targets are all rescued.
We do not make any assumptions on the probability distribution with which the targets
are located, but rather seek to find the randomized search that maximizes the probability of
success in the worst case. Equivalently, we study a zero-sum game between the Searcher and
a Hider who chooses where the targets are hidden. The latter way of framing the problem
is particular appropriate for military applications. We call this game the search and rescue
game, and it lies in the field of search games. For good general overviews of the literature on
search games, see Alpern and Gal (2003), Gal (2011) or Hohzaki (2016).
We begin by defining the game precisely in Section 2, in which we also point out a relation
of the game to a scheduling problem introduced by Agnetis et al. (2009). In Section 3, we give
a solution to the game. It turns out that the solution can be found by a similar method to
that of the game introduced by the author in Lidbetter (2013). The game studied in the latter
paper also involves a known number of targets located among a finite number of locations, but
there is no danger that the Searcher will be captured herself. Instead, there is a cost associated
with searching each location, and the objective is to minimize the total cost of finding all the
targets. Despite their similarities, the game of Lidbetter (2013) and the game of this paper do
not appear to be equivalent, so we unify them in a more general framework, simultaneously
giving solutions to both.
In Section 4 we extend the game so that it is played on a graph. More precisely, we assume
the hiding locations are vertices of the graph, and the Searcher must begin her search at a given
vertex. We assume that the vertices of the graph must be searched according to an expanding
search, a search paradigm introduced by the author in Alpern and Lidbetter (2013). Roughly
speaking, an expanding search of a graph is an ordering of the vertices such that each vertex is
adjacent to some previously chosen vertex. In the context of the search and rescue game, this
model of search is appropriate for situations in which locations must be searched contiguously,
and after each one has been successfully searched, it can be marked as “secure”, so that there
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is no danger of capture if the Searcher revisits it. The expanding search paradigm has been
used more recently in Angeloupolous et al. (2019) and Alpern and Lidbetter (2019).
We give a solution to the search and rescue game played on a tree in the case that there is
only one target, by giving a recursive method for calculating optimal strategies and the value
of the game. A similar approach was taken by Alpern (2010), who found the solution to a
different search game on a tree. In Alpern’s game, the Searcher walks on a tree with the aim
of minimizing the time taken to find a target, and the time taken to traverse an arc depends
on the direction of travel.
This work takes a different approach to much of the literature on search games, which have
the objective of minimizing some cost incurred in finding one or more target. In addition to the
papers on search games already cited, we finish this section by briefly discussing some other
recent work that takes a cost minimizing approach.
The classic model of network search games, as studied in Gal (1979) and Gal (2001),
assumes that a Searcher, beginning at a fixed point of a network, wishes to find a immobile
Hider located on the network in minimal time. This framework was extended in Dagan and
Gal (2008) and Alpern et al. (2008) to allow an arbitrary starting point for the Searcher, and
in Alpern (2019) to restrict both the Searcher’s starting point and the Hider’s hiding point to
a fixed subset of the network. Alpern and Lidbetter (2015) considered a model of network
search in which the Searcher has two speeds of travel: a slow speed at which she can detect the
object when she passes it, and a fast speed at which she cannot. Lidbetter (2017) evaluated
the performance of the Searcher strategy known as the Random Chinese Postman Tour in the
classic network search model of Gal (1979). Baston and Kikuta (2013, 2015) consider a more
general search game on a network where the vertices may have search costs that the Searcher
has to pay to search them.
There are some instances of search games being considered that do not take a cost mini-
mizing approach. For example Lin and Singham (2016) consider a game in which a Searcher
wishes to maximize the probability of finding a target before an unknown deadline; Gal and
Cassas (2014) introduced a predator-prey game in which a predator wishes to maximize the
probability of capturing the prey.
This is the first paper, as far as we are aware, to consider a search game that models a
scenario in which the Searcher may be captured herself.
2 Preliminaries
We now formally define the search and rescue game. A set of k targets must be rescued from
a set of locations S ≡ {1, . . . , n}, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. The locations must be searched
sequentially until all the targets have been found. If a location i is searched, there is a proba-
bility pi ∈ (0, 1) that the search is successful and all targets located there will be found. This
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probability is independent of where the location appears in the sequence. With probability
1 − pi, the Searcher will be captured herself, and no more locations can be searched. Note
that we disallow pi = 0 because the Hider could place a target in any such location i so that
the value of the game is 0, and we disallow pi = 1 because it is trivially the case that such a
location i should be searched first.
Formally, a strategy for the Searcher is an ordering σ : S → S, so that σ(i) is the hiding
location in the ith position in the ordering. We refer to an ordering σ as a search. For the
Hider, note that strategies in which more than one target is hidden in the same location are
dominated, so we take the Hider’s strategy set to be all subsets H ∈ S(k) ≡ {A ⊆ S : |A| = k}.
In order to define the payoff, first note that the probability the Searcher will be not be
captured while searching a subset A of hiding locations is
f(A) ≡
∏
i∈A
pi.
For a given Searcher strategy σ, let
Sσi = ∪{j ∈ S : σ−1(j) ≤ i}
be the first i locations searched. Then for a given Hider strategy H and Searcher strategy
σ, the payoff P (H,σ) of the game is f(Sσi ), where i is minimal such that H ⊆ Sσi . That is,
P (H,σ) is the probability that the Searcher will not be captured by the time she finds all the
targets.
The Searcher’s objective is to maximize the payoff, and the Hider’s is to minimize it. This
is a finite zero-sum game, so, by the minimax theorem of von Neumann (1928) for zero-sum
games, it has optimal (max-min) mixed strategies and a value. A mixed strategy s for the
Searcher is a probability distribution over all searches of S, and a mixed strategy h for the Hider
is a probability distribution over S(k). For a mixed Hider strategy h and a mixed Searcher
strategy s, we denote the expected payoff of the game by P (h, s).
2.1 Relation to Unreliable Job Sequencing
Consider the search and rescue game in the case that k = 1. In this case, a mixed strategy
for the Hider is a probability distribution over the set S of locations. Such a strategy can be
described by a vector of probabilities x ∈ Rn with ∑i xi = 1, where xi is the probability that
the Hider is in location i. Then for a given Searcher strategy σ, the probability P (x, σ) the
target is rescued when the Hider uses some mixed strategy x is given by
P (x, σ) = xσ(1)pσ(1) + xσ(2)pσ(1)pσ(2) + · · ·+ xσ(n)pσ(1) . . . pσ(n). (1)
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We call the problem of choosing σ to maximize P (x, σ) the best response problem, which is
distinct from the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for the Searcher in the game.
This problem has been considered by Agnetis et al. (2009) in the context of machine scheduling.
Here, the problem is that n jobs must be processed by a machine, and a reward of xi is obtained
after successfully processing job i. The jobs are processed sequentially, and the probability that
a job i is successfully processed is pi. Otherwise, with probability 1 − pi, job i fails, and no
more jobs can be processed. The expected reward for a given ordering of the jobs is equal to
P (x, σ).
Although Agnetis et al. (2009) consider the more general problem where the jobs are
sequenced by multiple machines, they show that if there is only one machine, the optimal
policy is given by ordering the jobs in non-increasing order of the index pixi/(1− pi).
Agnetis et al. (2009) also point out a connection between their problem and a classic prob-
lem of Monma and Sidney (1979) in which n components have to be sequentially tested until
either a component fails or all the components pass the tests. The cost of testing component i
is ci and the probability it passes the test is qi. Agnetis et al. (2009) show that with pi = qi and
xi = ci/qi, this problem is equivalent to choosing an ordering to minimize the expression on
the right-hand side of (1) (as opposed to their problem, which is to maximize it). The solution
is to order S in non-decreasing order of the index xipi/(1 − pi), rather than non-increasing
order.
3 A More General Search Game
We now place the search and rescue game in a more general context by defining a broader
class of search games between a Hider and a Searcher. As before, the game is played on a set
S of locations, and this time f : 2S → R is an arbitrary set function. We view f as a reward
function, and we assume that the values f(A) are given by an oracle. The Hider’s strategy set
is all subsets H ∈ S(k), for some k, and the Searcher’s strategy set is all searches (or orderings)
of S.
As before, for a given Hider strategy H and Searcher strategy σ, the payoff P = Pf of the
game is given by P (H,σ) = f(Sσi ), where i is minimal such that H ⊆ Sσi . The Searcher is the
maximizer and the Hider the minimizer. We will denote this game by Γf .
We give a sufficient condition on f for which Γf has a simple closed-form solution. For
i ∈ S and A ⊆ S, let fA(i) = f(A∪ i)− f(A). (For brevity, we write A∪ i for A∪{i} and f(i)
for f({i}).)
Definition 1 Let f : 2S → R be positive and f(A) < f(B) for B ⊂ A. If there is a z ∈ Rn
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with zr > 0 for all r, such that
fA∪j(i)
fA∪i(j)
=
zi
zj
when i /∈ A and j /∈ A, (2)
then f is z-indexable.
Note that the f being strictly decreasing implies that fA∪j(i) < 0 for all i, j /∈ A, so that
the left-hand side of (2) is well-defined and positive.
The term “indexable” is inspired by the use of the term in Bertsimas and Nin˜o-Mora (1996)
to describe dynamic and stochastic scheduling problems whose solution is given by assigning
an index to each job and, at every stage, choosing the job with the highest index.
We first observe that if f is indexable, then for k = 1, the best response problem for the
Γf is indexable, in the sense of Bertsimas and Nin˜o-Mora (1996).
Theorem 1 Suppose f is z-indexable, and consider a mixed Hider strategy x ∈ Rn. The
solution to the best response problem of Γf is to search the elements of S in non-increasing
order of the index xi/zi.
Proof. The proof is a standard interchange argument. For a fixed search σ, the expected
payoff of the game is
P (x, σ) =
n∑
i=1
xσ(i)f(S
σ
i ).
Suppose the elements of S are searched according to some search σ which is not in non-
increasing order of the index xi/zi. Let j be some element of S such that the index of the
element i that is searched immediately after j is larger than that of j. That is, xi/zi > xj/zj .
Let σ′ be the same as σ, with the order of elements i and j transposed.
Let A = Sσσ−1(j) − {j} be the subset of locations searched up but not including location j.
Then
P (x, σ)− P (x, σ′) = (xjf(A ∪ j) + xif(A ∪ {i, j}))− (xif(A ∪ i) + xjf(A ∪ {i, j}))
= xifA∪i(j)− xjfA∪j(i)
= zjfA∪j(i)
(
xi
zi
− xj
zj
)
(by (2))
> 0.
Hence, σ is not optimal, a contradiction. The theorem follows.
3.1 Examples of z-Indexable Games
Here we describe some examples of games Γf that are z-indexable.
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3.1.1 The search and rescue game.
It is easy to verify that for the search and rescue game, the function f is z-indexable. Indeed,
for i, j /∈ A, we have
fA∪j(i)
fA∪i(j)
=
(
pipj
∏
s∈A ps
)− (pj∏s∈A ps)(
pipj
∏
s∈A ps
)− (pi∏s∈A ps) = pj(1− pi)pi(1− pj) .
Thus, we can take zi = (1 − pi)/pi, and Theorem 1 implies that the solution to the best
response problem for k = 1 is to search the locations in non-increasing order of the index
xi/zi = xipi/(1− pi). This is consistent with the result of Agnetis et al. (2009).
We may also extend the game, as in Agnetis et al. (2009), by incorporating a discount
factor on the probabilities xi. More precisely, suppose that if there is a target at the location
that appears in position t of a search, there is a probability γt that the target will be there
when that location is searched, where 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1. This could be the result of an increased
likelihood that the target will not survive as time goes on, due to dangerous environmental
factors or a malicious adversary.
This is equivalent to the original game with new probabilities p′i = γpi, and we obtain
fA∪j(i)
fA∪i(j)
=
p′j(1− p′i)
p′i(1− p′j)
=
pj(1− γpi)
pi(1− γpj) .
Thus, we can take zi = (1 − γpi)/pi, and it follows from Theorem 1 that the solution to
the best response problem for k = 1 is to search the locations in non-increasing order of
xi/zi = xipi/(1− γpi), as shown directly in Agnetis et al. (2009).
3.1.2 An additive search game
This example is taken from Lidbetter (2013). In this game, each location i in S has a search
cost ci > 0 which the Searcher must pay to search it. The objective is to order the locations so
as to minimize the sum of the search costs of all the locations searched until all k targets have
been found. In order to fit our framework of a decreasing function f , we take f(A) =
∑
i/∈A ci
to be the cost of locations not searched. In this case, for i, j /∈ A, we have
fA∪j(i)
fA∪i(j)
=
(−ci − cj +
∑
s/∈A cs)− (−ci −
∑
s/∈A cs)
(−ci − cj −
∑
s/∈A cs)− (−cj −
∑
s/∈A cs)
=
ci
cj
,
and we can take zi = ci. Hence, by Theorem 1, the solution to the best response problem for
k = 1 is to search the locations in non-increasing order of xi/zi = xi/ci.
The best response problem to this game is a well-known search problem, first considered
by Bellman (1957) (Chapter III, Exercise 3, p.90), and the solution is nothing new. It can
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equivalently be framed as the single machine scheduling problem posed by Smith (1956), now
notated in the scheduling literature by 1||∑wjCj . The rule that the locations should be
searched in non-increasing order of xi/zi is known as Smith’s Rule.
3.1.3 A search game on a graph with traveling and search costs
We describe here an application to a game introduced by Baston and Kikuta (2013). The
game is played on a graph with vertices S, and the Hider hides at one of the vertices. The
Searcher starts at any vertex of her choosing and follows a walk in the network (that is, a
sequence of vertices, each one of which is adjacent to the previous vertex). Each time the
Searcher traverses an edge e, she pays a cost d(e), and when visiting a vertex i, she can choose
to search it for a search cost of ci. If the Hider is located at a vertex, the Searcher finds him
if and only if she pays the search cost. The payoff is the total cost to find the Hider.
Baston and Kikuta (2013) solve the game for graphs that have a Hamiltonian, in the case
that the traveling costs d(e) are all equal to 1. Here, we generalize their game to allow multiple
targets to be hidden at vertices of the graph, so that the Searcher wants to minimize the cost of
finding all the targets. In the case that the graph is complete (that is, there is an edge between
every pair of vertices), the total cost of searching a subset A of vertices is |A|−1 +∑i∈A ci. In
this case, the game can be modeled by Γf , where we let f(A) = |S − A|+
∑
i/∈A ci, to ensure
the Searcher is the maximizer. Then for i, j /∈ A, we have
fA∪j(i)
fA∪i(j)
=
(|S −A| − ci − cj +
∑
s/∈A cs)− (|S −A| − cj +
∑
s/∈A cs)
(|S −A| − ci − cj +
∑
s/∈A cs)− (|S −A| − ci +
∑
s/∈A cs)
=
1 + ci
1 + cj
,
so we can put zi = 1 + ci.
Note that this game is actually equivalent to the game described in the previous subsection,
if we take the cost of a location i to be equal to ci + 1.
3.2 Solution to the Game Γf
We now present a solution to the game Γf when f is z-indexable. The solution mirrors
the solution of the additive search game considered in Lidbetter (2013). We will see that in
the solution, the Searcher will randomize between mixed strategies which search some subset
A ∈ S(k) first, in an arbitrary order, then choose the other elements of S in a uniformly random
order. We denote such a strategy by sA. Note that the order of the first k elements of the
search do not matter, since the Searcher must search at least k locations before finding all k
targets.
Lemma 1 Consider the game Γf , for an arbitrary function f : 2
S → R. For any A,B ∈ S(k),
we have Pf (A, sB) = Pf (B, sA).
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Proof. First suppose the Hider uses strategy A and the Searcher uses strategy sB, and we
will calculate the expected payoff P (A, sB). Observe that the strategy sB must search all the
elements of B before finding the k targets (since these are the first k locations searched) and
it must search all the elements of A before finding the targets, because this is where they are
located. Each other element of S, contained in the complement (A∪B)c is searched with some
probability q before the k targets are found. This probability q must be the same for every
element of (A ∪B)c, since the elements of Bc are searched in a uniformly random order.
Let X be a random variable equal to f(A ∪ B ∪ C), where the elements of C are chosen
independently with probability q from the set (A ∪ B)c. Then, the expected payoff P (A, sB)
is equal to the expectation E(X).
Clearly, by symmetry, the expected payoff P (B, sA) is also equal to E(X).
We will use a simple but useful lemma, which we state without proof (see Lemma 2.6 of
Lidbetter (2013) for the proof).
Lemma 2 Consider an arbitrary zero-sum game with a symmetric payoff matrix in which
Player I has a mixed strategy x that makes Player II indifferent between all her pure strategies.
Then x is an optimal strategy for both Player I and Player II.
We can now solve the search and rescue game, but to state the solution we will use the
following definition.
Definition 2 For a subset A ⊆ S, let
Tk(A) ≡
∑
B∈A(k)
∏
i∈B
zi.
Note that
Tk(A ∪ i)zj − Tk(A ∪ j)zi = zjTk(A)− ziTk(A). (3)
Theorem 2 Consider the search game Γf , and suppose f is z-indexable. Then it is optimal
for the Hider to use the mixed strategy q, whereby a set A ∈ S(k) is chosen with probability qA
given by
qA ≡
∏
i∈A zi
Tk(S)
,
It is optimal for the Searcher to use the strategy s that chooses sA with probability proportional
to qA.
Proof. Suppose the Hider uses the strategy q described in the statement of the theorem. We
will show transposing any two adjacent elements of a given search σ leaves the expected payoff
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unchanged. Since any search can be obtained from σ by a sequence of such transpositions, this
is sufficient to prove that all searches have the same expected cost against this Hider strategy.
Thus, suppose in a search σ, the element i comes immediately before j, and let σ′ be
the search that is the same as σ except that elements i and j are transposed. If j comes in
position k or earlier in σ, then clearly transposing i and j leaves the expected payoff unchanged.
Otherwise, we can compute the difference in the expected payoffs of the two searches against
the Hider strategy q as follows. Let A denote the set of locations searched before i.
P (q, σ)− P (q, σ′) =
(
Tk−1(A)zi
Tk(S)
f(A ∪ i) + Tk−1(A ∪ i)zj
Tk(S)
f(A ∪ {i, j})
)
−
(
Tk−1(A)zj
Tk(S)
f(A ∪ j) + Tk−1(A ∪ j)zi
Tk(S)
f(A ∪ {i, j})
)
. (4)
Considering the coefficient of f(A ∪ {i, j}) in (4), and using (3) with k replaced by k − 1, we
get
P (q, σ)− P (q, σ′) = Tk−1(A)
Tk(S)
(zjfA∪j(i)− zifA∪i(j))
= 0,
by (2).
The argument above shows that the value of the game is at most V , where V = P (q, σ) is
the payoff when the Hider uses the strategy q against any Searcher strategy σ. If we restrict
the Searcher to strategies of the form sA, then the value of the restricted game is equal to V
and the strategies s and q are optimal, by Lemmas 1 and 2. Since the value, V of the restricted
game is a lower bound for the value of the original (unrestricted) game, the strategies q and s
must also be optimal in the original game.
Theorem 2.1 of Lidbetter (2013), which gives the solution of the additive search game,
follows as a corollary of Theorem 2 of this paper. Our theorem also gives a solution to the
search and rescue game. If k = 1, there is a particularly simple expression for the value of the
game.
Theorem 3 In the search and rescue game it is optimal for the Hider to choose a subset
A ∈ S(k) with probability
qA ≡ λk
∏
i∈A
1− pi
pi
, where λk ≡
 ∑
B∈S(k)
∏
i∈B
1− pi
pi
−1 .
It is optimal for the Searcher to choose a subset A ∈ S(k) of locations to search first with
probability qA, then search the remaining locations in a uniformly random order. For k = 1,
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the value V of the game is
V ≡ λ1(1−
∏
i∈S
pi) (5)
Proof. The optimality of the Hider’s and Searcher’s strategies follows immediately from
Theorem 2. To prove the correctness of (5), it is sufficient to show that against the given Hider
strategy, some (and therefore, every) search has expected payoff V . Let σ be the search that
chooses the locations in increasing order from 1 to n. Then
P (q, σ) =
n∑
i=1
qi
∏
j≤i
pj
= λ1
n∑
i=1
1− pi
pi
∏
j≤i
pj
= λ1
n∑
i=1
(1− pi)
∏
j<i
pj .
The sum is telescopic, and reduces to the expression on the right-hand side of (5).
4 The Search and Rescue Game on a Graph
In this section we consider the search and rescue game played on a graph. That is, we assume
that the set of hiding locations S are the vertices V (G) of a graph G with edge set E(G), which
is a collection of unordered pairs of vertices (i, j), i 6= j. The Searcher begins at a specified
vertex O of the graph, called the root, and can search the graph using an expanding search,
which is a search paradigm introduced by the author in Alpern and Lidbetter (2013). An
expanding search of a graph G with root O is an ordering of the vertices S, starting with O,
such that each vertex in the ordering is adjacent to some previous vertex.
Formally, a Searcher strategy is a ordering σ of S such that σ(1) = O and if i > 1, then
(σ(i), σ(i− 1)) ∈ E(G). In this section we will refer to such an ordering simply as a search. If
α is the restriction of some search σ to some set {i, i + 1, . . . , j}, then we call α a subsearch
of the vertices A = σ({i, i+ 1, . . . , j}). In other words, α describes the sequence of vertices in
positions i through j in the search.
The only difference between the game played on a graph and the original version of the
game described in Section 2 is that the Searcher’s strategy set is restricted. In particular, a
Hider strategy is still a probability distribution on S, given by a vector x ∈ Rn; the probability
that the Searcher is not captured when she searches a vertex v is denoted by pv; the payoff
of the game is calculated in the same way. We relax the restriction pv ∈ (0, 1) slightly, by
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allowing pv to take the value 1 as long as v 6= O is not a leaf (a vertex of degree 1), otherwise
it could be removed from the graph without changing the value of the game. The reason for
this is that it will be convenient later to make the assumption that all vertices have degree at
most 3, and we will justify this assumption adding vertices v with pv = 1 to the tree to obtain
an equivalent game on a tree with the desired property.
Playing the game on a network complicates things, and we therefore restrict ourselves to
the case k = 1, leaving larger values of k for future work.
We illustrate expanding search with an example. Consider the tree in depicted in Figure 1.
The vertices are labeled with letters, and the probabilities pi are shown next to the vertices.
One possible expanding search on this network visits the vertices in the order O,D,A,B,C.
If the target is located at B, say, then the payoff is (1/2) · (3/5) · (2/3) · (1/3) = 1/15.
Figure 1: A tree with probabilities pv indicated.
Note that if pO = 1 and the graph is a star (that is, a tree where O is the only vertex
of degree greater than 1), then an expanding search of the graph corresponds simply to an
(unrestricted) ordering of all the leaf vertices. The search and rescue game played on such a
graph is therefore equivalent to the game without any network structure. Equivalently, the
game could be played on a complete graph.
In order to solve the search and rescue game played on a tree, we define something similar
to the index zi in Section 3. First we introduced some more notation. For a subset A ⊆ S, let
pi(A) denote
∏
i∈A pi. If G is a graph, we may write pi(G) to express pi(V (G)). We also expand
the definition of the payoff function P . For a subsearch α of vertices σ({i, i + 1, . . . , j}), and
a fixed Hider strategy x, let
P (x, α) = xα(i)pα(i) + xα(i+1)pα(i)pα(i+1) + · · ·+ xα(j)pα(i) · · · pα(j).
In particular, if σ is a search of the whole of S, then P (x, σ) is the payoff of the game when
the Hider uses x. We will usually drop the x in P (x, α), and simply write P (α) when there is
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no ambiguity.
We remark that the solution of the best response problem for the game played on a tree
follows from the work of Monma and Sidney (1979), since the function P can be easily shown to
satisfy what the authors call the series-network decomposition property. We give the solution
here to the game played on a tree.
For a fixed Hider strategy x and subsearch α of vertices A with pi(A) 6= 1, we define an
index
I(α) ≡ Ix(α) ≡ P (α)/(1− pi(A)).
The restriction pi(A) 6= 1 insures that I(α) is well defined. Note that if α consists of a single
element i, then the index of α is equal to xipi/(1 − pi), which is the same as the index
determining the optimal search in the best response problem for the game played with no
network structure. We now prove a more general lemma, which says that if two subsearches
are disjoint and can be executed consecutively in some order, then the subsearch with the
highest index should come first.
Lemma 3 Let x be some fixed Hider strategy and let σ be a search. Suppose some subsearch
α of σ searches a subset A ⊆ S of vertices immediately before some other subsearch β searches
a subset B ⊆ S disjoint from A, with pi(A), pi(B) 6= 1. Let σ′ be the same as σ except that the
order of α and β are transposed. Then P (σ) ≤ P (σ′) if and only if
I(α) ≥ I(β), (6)
with P (σ) = P (σ′) if and only if (6) holds with equality.
Proof. Let C ⊆ S be the set of locations searched immediately before α in σ. Then
P (σ′)− P (σ) = (pi(C)P (α) + pi(C ∪A)P (β))− (pi(C)P (β) + pi(C ∪B)P (α))
= pi(C)(1− pi(A))(1− pi(B)) (I(α)− I(β)) ,
by definition of I(α) and I(β). The lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 3 is a variation of the Search Density Lemma, found in various guises in studies of
other search games, for example in Alpern (2010), Alpern and Lidbetter (2013) and Fokkink
et al. (2019).
We present a solution to the game on a tree. We may assume that the maximum degree
of any vertex of the tree is 3. If not, then by successively adding vertices v with p(v) = 1, we
can iteratively transform the tree into a tree with degree at most 3 such that the value of the
game is the same on both trees and there is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies on
one and on the other. Thus, any solution of the game for the transformed tree can be mapped
back onto the original tree. For example, suppose Figure 2 depicts a subgraph of a particular
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tree: in particular, the degree 4 vertex A and its neighbors. Assume that B is closer to O than
A. In other words, the path from A to O contains the vertex B, so that in any search of the
tree, B must appear before A. Then the subgraph depicted on the left of the figure can be
replaced with the subtree shown on the right, where pX = 1, so that there is zero probability
that the Searcher will be captured after she searches the vertex X. Strategies on the new tree
map onto strategies on the original one in a natural way, with no alteration to the payoffs.
Figure 2: Transformation of a degree 4 vertex.
We recursively define a strategy h ≡ hG for the Hider on a tree G which we will later prove
is optimal. We also define recursively a quantity VG, which we will later prove is the value of
the game. We first define the branches of a tree G with root O as the connected components
of the tree obtained when O and its incident edges are removed from G. The roots of the
branches are the neighbors of O. We call vertices v with degree 3 branch vertices. We also
refer to O as a branch vertex if it has degree 2.
Definition 3 (Tree hiding strategy) The Hider strategy hG is defined recursively as fol-
lows for rooted trees G. If G has only has one vertex v, then let hG(v) = 1 and VG = pv. If
G has more than one vertex, there are two cases, depending on whether or not O is a branch
vertex.
Case 1. The root O is not a branch vertex. In this case, let G′ be the unique branch of G
and let O′ be its root. The Hider strategy hG on G is given by hG(O) = 0 and hG(v) = hG′(v)
for all vertices v in G′. Let VG = pOVG′.
Case 2. The root O is a branch vertex. In this case, let G1 and G2 be the branches of G
and let O1 and O2 be their roots. Then we set
hG(Gi) = λG
(
1− pi(Gi)
VGi
)
, i = 1, 2,
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where
λG =
(
1− pi(G1)
VG1
+
1− pi(G2)
VG2
)−1
is a normalizing factor. Then for a vertex v in Gi, we set
hG(v) = hG(Gi)hGi(v).
We also set
VG = pOλG(1− pi(G1)pi(G2)).
Note that the support of h is the set of leaves of G (excluding O, if it is a leaf). It is obvious
that the support of any optimal strategy must be the set of leaves, because all other vertices
are dominated by some leaf.
We illustrate the computation of hG and VG for the tree depicted in Figure 1. For any
vertex v, let G(v) be the subtree of G containing all vertices whose path to O contains v. Using
VG(B) = 1/3 and VG(C) = 1/2, we compute
λG(D) =
(
1− pi(G(B))
VG(B)
+
1− pi(G(C))
VG(C)
)−1
=
(
1− 1/3
1/3
+
1− 1/2
1/2
)−1
= 1/3.
Hence, we find that
hG(D)(B) = λG(D)
(
1− pi(G(B))
VG(B)
)
= (1/3)
(
1− 1/3
1/3
)
= 2/3 and
hG(D)(C) = λG(D)
(
1− pi(G(C))
VG(C)
)
= (1/3)
(
1− 1/2
1/2
)
= 1/3.
Also,
VG(D) = pDλG(D)(1− pi(G(B))pi(G(C))) = (3/5)(1/3)(1− (1/3)(1/2)) = 1/6.
Now using VG(A) = 2/3, we compute
λG =
(
1− pi(G(A))
VG(A)
+
1− pi(G(D))
VG(D)
)−1
=
(
1− 2/3
2/3
+
1− (1/3)(1/2)(3/5)
1/6
)−1
= 10/59.
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Hence,
hG(A) = λG
(
1− pi(G(A))
VG(A)
)
= (10/59)
(
1− 2/3
2/3
)
= 5/59 and
hG(G(D)) = λG
(
1− pi(G(D))
VG(D)
)
= (10/59)
(
1− (1/3)(1/2)(3/5)
1/6
)
= 54/59.
It follows that
hG(B) = hG(G(D))hG(D)(B) = (54/59)(2/3) = 36/59 and
hG(C) = hG(G(D))hG(D)(C) = (54/59)(1/3) = 18/59.
The value of the game is
VG = pOλG(1− pi(G(A))pi(G(D))) = (1/2)(10/59)(1− (2/3)(1/3)(1/2)(3/5)) = 14/177.
This completes the calculation of the tree hiding strategy for the tree in Figure 1.
To show that the Hider strategy hG guarantees an expected payoff of at most VG, we first
show that any depth-first search of G has expected payoff VG against hG, where the formal
definition of a depth-first search is as follows.
Definition 4 (Depth-first search) Let G be a tree with root O. A depth-first search of G is
a search such that for any vertex v, all the other vertices of G(v) appear in the search in some
order immediately after v.
Lemma 4 Suppose the Hider is located on a tree G according to the tree hiding strategy. Then
any depth-first search σ of G has expected payoff P (σ) = VG.
Proof. Let σ be a depth-first search of G. The proof is by induction on the number of vertices
of G. The lemma is trivially true when there is only one vertex, so suppose G has at least 2
vertices. There are two cases, depending on whether or not O is a branch vertex. First suppose
O is not a branch vertex, in which case let G′ be its one branch, with root O′. By the induction
hypothesis, the expected payoff of any depth-first search of G′ is VG. Then clearly the expected
payoff of σ is
P (σ) = p(O)VG′ ≡ VG,
by definition of VG.
In the other case, O is a branch vertex and let G1 and G2 be the branches of G, with
roots O1 and O2, respectively. By the induction hypothesis, any depth-first search of Gi has
expected payoff VGi for i = 1, 2. Suppose, without loss of generality, that σ performs successive
depth-first searches σ1 and σ2 of G1 and G2 in that order, after searching O. Then the expected
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payoff of σ is
P (σ) = pO(P (σ1) + pi(G1)P (σ2)).
By induction, P (σi) = hG(Gi)VGi for all i = 1, 2, and by definition of h, we have hG(Gi) =
λG(1− pi(Gi))/VGi . Hence,
P (σ) = pOλG((1− pi(G1) + pi(G1)(1− pi(G2))) = pOλG(1− pi(G)) ≡ VG.
In order to show that the value of the game is bounded above by VG, it is sufficient to
prove that depth-first searches are best responses to the Hider strategy hG. This follows from
the fact that the indices of both branches of a branch vertex are equal. We prove both of these
next.
Lemma 5 Suppose the Hider is located on a tree G according to the strategy hG.
(i) Suppose v is a branch vertex and let σ1 and σ2 be depth-first searches of the branches G1
and G2 of G(v). Then I(σ1) = I(σ2).
(ii) Any depth-first search is a best response to the tree hiding strategy hG, and hG ensures
the expected payoff of the game is at most VG.
Proof. For part (i), by Lemma 4, we have that P (σi) = hG(Gi)VGi = hG(G(v))hG(v)(Gi)VGi
for i = 1, 2. By definition of hG(v)(Gi), we have
P (σi) = hG(v)λG(v)(1− pi(Gi)).
Hence,
I(σi) =
P (σ)
1− pi(Gi) = hG(v)λG(v).
This expression is independent of i.
For part (ii), suppose there exists a best response σ to h that is not depth-first. Then
there must exist branch vertex v such that the two branches G1 and G2 of G(v) are not
searched consecutively, but the subsearches of the branches are both depth-first. Without loss
of generality, assume that G1 is searched before G2. We may also assume that v appears in the
search immediately before G1, since if some other vertex w were searched immediately before
G1, then the order of search of v and w could be swapped, and the expected payoff would not
be any greater.
So there must exist consecutive subsearches σ1, τ, σ2, where σ1 and σ2 are depth-first
searches of G1 and G2 and τ is a subsearch of some other subset A of vertices, disjoint from
G(v).
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Since pi is optimal, by Lemma 3, we must have
I(σ1) ≥ I(τ) ≥ I(σ2) (7)
But, by part (i), we have I(σ1) = I(σ2), and it follows that all the inequalities in (7) hold with
equality.
Therefore, by Lemma 3, the search σ′ that results from the subsearches σ1 and τ being
swapped has the same expected payoff as σ, and is therefore a best response to hG.
But σ′ searches G(v) in a depth-first manner, and applying this argument repeatedly, we
can transform σ into a depth-first search which is also a best response to hG. By Lemma 4,
every depth-first search has the same expected payoff, and is therefore a best response to hG,
and the Hider can ensure that the value of the game is at most VG.
We now define the strategy mixed strategy s = sG that will turn out to be optimal for the
Searcher. Similarly to the Hider’s strategy, we define it recursively. We first need a technical
lemma to ensure that the strategy sG is well defined.
Lemma 6 For any tree G, we have that 1 ≥ VG ≥ pi(G).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of vertices of G. It is clearly true when G
has only one vertex, so suppose G has more than one vertex and that the lemma is true for
trees with fewer vertices than G.
First suppose that O is not a branch vertex and let O′ be the neighbor of O. Then by the
induction hypothesis, 1 ≥ VG′ ≥ pi(G′), so VG ≡ p(O)VG′ ≥ p(O)pi(G′) = pi(G). Also, clearly
VG ≤ p(O) ≤ 1.
Now suppose that O is a branch vertex, and let G1 and G2 be the two branches. Then by
the induction hypothesis, VG1 ≥ pi(G1) and VG2 ≥ pi(G2), and it follows that
λ(G) ≥
(
1− pi(G1)
pi(G1)
+
1− pi(G2)
pi(G2)
)−1
=
pi(G1)pi(G2)
pi(G2)(1− pi(G1)) + pi(G1)(1− pi(G2))
≥ pi(G1)pi(G2)
1− pi(G1) + pi(G1)(1− pi(G2))
=
pi(G1)pi(G2)
1− pi(G1)pi(G2) .
It follows that VG ≡ pOλ(G)(1− pi(G1)pi(G2)) = pi(G).
Also, by the induction hypothesis, VG1 ≤ 1 and VG2 ≤ 1, and it follows from the definition
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of λ(G) that
λ(G) ≤ (1− pi(G1) + 1− pi(G2))−1
≤ (1− pi(G1) + pi(G1)(1− pi(G2)))−1
= (1− pi(G1)pi(G2))−1.
If follows that VG ≡ pOλ(G)(1− pi(G1)pi(G2)) ≤ 1.
Definition 5 (Tree searching strategy) The tree searching strategy sG is a probabilistic
choice of depth-first searches of a tree G, and is fully described by specifying which branch is
searched first at each branch vertex. Suppose v is such a vertex, and let G1 and G2 be the two
branches. Then G1 is searched first with probability
qG1 = λ(G)
(
1
VG1
− pi(G2)
VG2
)
,
otherwise G2 is searched first.
It is easy to check that qG1+qG2 = 1, so to check that qG1 and qG2 are well defined probabilities,
we just need to verify that they are both non-negative. To see that qG1 is non-negative, note
that by Lemma 6, we have 1/VG1 ≥ 1 and pi(G2)/VG2 ≤ 1. Similarly for q2.
Before proving the tree searching strategy guarantees an expected payoff of at least VG
for the Searcher, we illustrate the calculation of the probabilities that define the strategy by
considering the tree in Figure 1. The tree searching strategy is specified by the probability
qG(A) of searching G(A) before G(D) and the probability qG(B) of searching G(B) before G(C).
The first probability is
qG(A) = λ(G)
(
1
VG(A)
− pi(G(D))
VG(D)
)
=
(
10
59
)(
1
2/3
− (1/3)(1/2)(3/5)
1/6
)
=
9
59
.
The second probability is
qG(B) = λ(G(D))
(
1
VG(B)
− pi(G(C))
VG(C)
)
=
(
1
3
)(
1
1/3
− 1/2
1/2
)
=
2
3
.
Lemma 7 The tree searching strategy sG ensures an expected payoff of at least VG against any
Hider pure strategy.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of vertices of G (it is obviously true for
graphs with one vertex). Suppose that G has more than one vertex, and first suppose that O
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is not a branch vertex, that O′ is the vertex adjacent to O and G′ is the tree rooted at O′.
Then by induction, the expected payoff is at least pO′VG′ ≡ VG.
Now suppose that O is a branch vertex, and let G1 and G2 be the two branches of G, so
that depth-first searches of these subtrees are performed in some order. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that the Hider is located in G1. Then, by induction, the expected payoff satisfies
P (s) ≥ qG1VG1 + qG2pi(G2)VG1
= λ(G)
(
1
VG1
− pi(G2)
VG2
)
VG1 + λ(G)
(
1
VG2
− pi(G1)
VG1
)
pi(G2)VG1
= λ(G)(1− pi(G)) ≡ VG.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4 The value of the game is VG ≡ λ(G)(1−pi(G)). An optimal strategy for the Hider
is the tree hiding strategy hG and an optimal strategy for the Searcher is the tree searching
strategy s(G).
Proof. Suppose the Hider uses the strategy hG. Then, by Lemma 5, the expected payoff is at
most VG, so this is an upper bound for the value of the game.
On the other hand, if the Searcher uses the strategy sG then by Lemma 7, the expected
payoff is at least VG, and it follows that the value is at least VG.
Putting together these two bounds on the value, the theorem follows.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a new search game to model search and rescue operations in which there
is a threat the Searcher will be captured herself. We solved the game in which an arbitrary
number of targets must be captured, and in the case of one target we solved the game when
played on the vertices of a graph. There are many open questions and variations of the game
that must be left to future work. What is the solution to the game for k > 1 on trees, or for
k = 1 on other classes of graphs? What happens if we relax the assumption that the Searcher
starts at a fixed vertex, as in Baston and Kikuta (2013, 2015)? We could also consider a
variation of the game in which there is more than one Searcher, similarly to the scheduling
problem in Agnetis et al. (2009). This paper scratches the surface, but we believe this opens
up an interesting and potential fruitful avenue of new study.
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